Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR)

Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR):

Based on the Department of Defense (DOD) Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR):

Briefly describe which of the lines of effort listed is the greatest challenge (combat operations, information operations or building partner capacity). Next, explain how the DOD can overcome that challenge. Fully support and defend your answer using logic and citations of supporting material where appropriate (course material, doctrine, outside sources).

 Fully support and defend your answer using logic and citations of supporting material where appropriate (course material, doctrine, outside sources).

To be successful in this assignment, you must display critical thinking as you analyze specific joint elements surrounding OIR.

The paper must: include a Cover Page, Abstract (with 200 words), the Paper, & Endnotes as a single file,

• answer the question.
• display critical thinking through analysis and logical argument.
• display accurate understanding of joint topics.
• be well written throughout – grammar, organization, presentation.
• be a 1200 (+/- 50) word paper – does not include Cover Page, Abstract, or Endnotes.
• have 1-inch margins on all sides.
• be in Times New Roman 12pt font for all text except Endnotes which may be 10pt.
• be double-spaced except for Endnotes

The abstract is an important part of the paper. For this assignment an Informative Abstract (Informative abstract explains information in a larger work and includes results, conclusions and recommendations) is the most appropriate form to use. Your abstract should address:

• Motivation or Problem – establish why your paper is important and worthy of being read.
• Method of Analysis – explain the approach you took to fully analyze the topic.
• Findings or Results – describe what was learned through your analysis.
• Implications or Conclusions – provide any implications or conclusions that resulted from your analysis.
• be 200 words (+/- 50 words)

Solution 1

Abstract

In the fight against terrorism, the combined effort of the international community is critical. Forging of efficient partnerships with different actors enhances and promote efficiency in the elimination of terrorist threats, the promotion of national and international security and create effective grounds for sustainable national prosperity. The Inherent Operation Resolve coalition has proven efficient in fighting terrorism especially in eliminating terrorist groups/organizations. However, the threat posed by ISIS/ISIL remains adamant amidst the different challenges that the coalition faces. This essay identifies poor coordination and the incoherence caused by the lack of a single authority as the greatest challenge to the success of the coalition. It states that the challenge limits efficiency in the implementation of military strategies, acting on intelligence, using resources, and promoting the objectives of the mission and affects adjudication between coalition partners. Further, through an extensive review and application of credible literature, it argues that the practical implementation of the Joint Task Force function of command and control will solve the problem and lead the coalition towards the anticipated success. That the research applies credible sources and depicts accuracy and precision makes it credible and reliable for further study on the issue.  

Operation Inherent Resolve

The continued resolve by the international community to fight terrorism has led to the development of different measures for the elimination of the threat and the improvement of peace, promotion of humanity, and better international relations. The U.S. leads the war on terror with the development of coordinated strategies focused on defeating terrorists abroad and acquiring the cooperation of international partners. It continues to forge relationships and partnerships with different actors such as foreign governments, non-state actors, and multilateral organizations to promote counterterrorism objectives and promote national and international security. The Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) is a military operation by the U.S. for the intervention against the ISIL in the fight against terrorism. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant poses a threat not only to the region but also to the U.S. and the international community[1]. In the operation, the U.S. has forged partnerships leading to a coalition, the Joint Task Force – OIR. However, the coalition faces a great challenge which must be solved to guarantee success.  

The major challenge to the success of the OIR is the inefficiency experienced in the coordination of the coalition. The coordination of the coalition remains the greatest challenge to the success of OIR in fighting the ISIL. The poor coordination mainly due to the lack of a single authority for the prioritization and adjudication between the coalition partners causes inefficiency in the implementation of strategies, acting on intelligence, and promoting the objectives of the coalition. The different coalition partners have different and conflicting longer-term geopolitical interests in the Iraq and the Levant. The challenge causes incoherence in the implementation of intelligence, surveillance, ad reconnaissance forces often making it difficult for ISR to support critical military requirements. In addition, the incoherence makes it difficult for the different coalition partners to work efficiently towards the achievement of the coalition’s objectives[2]. As such, there is a need for the operation to integrate specific measures to overcome the challenge and elevate its chances of success.

The effective implementation of command and control will play a significant role in the elimination of the challenge. Applying the joint function of command and control will enhance efficiency in the military operations of the coalition in fighting the ISIL. There is a need for the coalition to implement a unity of command where all the forces work and operate under a single commander. The single commander would apply requisite authority that directs the forces towards the pursuit of a common purpose in the fight against the ISIL. Additionally, there is a need for the command to integrate the unity of effort for enhanced coordination and cooperation among the forces in the quest for the attainment of a common and recognized objective. Even when the different parties have differing geopolitical interests, the command will ensure coordination and cooperation in the pursuit a common goal. The major objective of the coalition is the fight against and the elimination of the threat of insecurity and terrorism posed by the ISIL[3].

The command and control of the JTF – OIR must focus on the enhancement of efficiency in the establishment, organization, and operations of the joint force. The success of the coalition depends greatly on the ability of the command to establish an effective military force that works towards the common goal of controlling and submitting the ISIL. In the process of doing, Watson argues that the organization of the task force is important[4]. Organizing the forces will call for single command with a clear chain of command for the subordinate forces. The chain of command will require articulate communication channels and effective organization of the forces to elevate efficiency. The coalition should focus on ensuring that every command and every coalition party operates in accordance with the guidelines set for the operation.  Additionally, the command and control system must avail facilities, equipment, sufficient personnel for efficient preparation, monitoring, and assessment of operations to make sure that the different parties prioritize the common agenda.

The effective implementation of changes within the command and control systems will integrate technologies that enhance effectiveness in command, communication, organizing, planning, and directing, and thus improve the chances of success of the operation. According to Powell, the development of portable, cloud-enabled technologies for command and control would enhance efficiency in all the military processes[5]. The commanders and their staffs must have the necessary paraphernalia for undertaking the different duties. The most effective technological change would be the integration of mobile technologies in the command and control (CC) platforms. This will play a significant role in improving communication and the implementation of military strategy. Moreover, the technologies will improve the ability to build situational awareness, implement plans, organize and direct operations. The creation of a common set of CC applications and their availability in cloud services will ensure easier and well-organized sharing information and reconciling operational pictures during the operations.

Additionally, the integration of joint professional military education in the operation will enhance the unity of purpose and the realization of the mission of command in joint operations. The different military units and coalition parties depict differences relating to the characteristic missions and the primary operating domains. The joint professional education makes sure that the parties have a common understanding ensuring that the principles of the mission of command function together during the joint operations[6]. Additionally, the joint military education informs the commanders and their staffs and allows the alignment of command philosophy with the requirements set for the specific missions. Also, it ensures that the command, staff, and military personnel understand the environment and apply different techniques and equipment for specific missions. Of greater importance, however, the education ensures that the different parties understand and prioritize their missions in accordance with the set operational objectives[7]. As such, if the operation is to achieve the desired success, it is important to ensure sufficient joint professional military education and understanding of mission command in the joint operations.  

In conclusion, in the quest for the promotion of national and international security, the government must work with the international community to fight and eliminate the threat of terrorism. The U.S. leads the war on terror through the development of coordinated strategies and partnerships with different actors targeting terrorist groups and terrorists, whether domestic or foreign. The OIR coalition promotes national and international security by fighting the ISIL. However, the operation faces the challenge of incoherence in command that limits coordination and the success of the operation. The command and control of the operation must integrate change in the operation to guarantee success. It is important to adopt a single command, implement it effectively, integrate technological change in command and control, and offer joint professional military education to improve the efficiency of the coalition.

Bibliography

Marsico, Katie. ISIS. New York: ABDO, 2016.

McInnis, Kathleen J. Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State. New York: Congressional Research Service, 2015.

Powell, D. A. The military applications of cloud computing technologies. 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589625 (accessed February 8, 2016).

U.S. Department of Defense. Operation Inherent Resolve. 2016. http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve.

U.S. Government. Guide to Operation Inherent Resolve 2015: Information and Commentary on America’s War Against the Islamic State, Isis, ISIL, Daesh Terrorists in Iraq and Syria, Al-baghdadi, Levant, Al-Qaeda in Syria. Washington, DC: Createspace Independent Publications, 2015.

Watson, Cynthia Ann. Military Education : A Reference Handbook. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007.

[1] U.S. Government. Guide to Operation Inherent Resolve 2015: Information and Commentary on America’s War Against the Islamic State, Isis, ISIL, Daesh Terrorists in Iraq and Syria, Al-baghdadi, Levant, Al-Qaeda in Syria. Washington, DC: Createspace Independent Publications, 2015, pp. 3.

[2] McInnis, Kathleen J. Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State. New York: Congressional Research Service, 2015, pp. 7.

[3] U.S. Department of Defense. Operation Inherent Resolve. 2016. http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve.

[4] Watson, Cynthia Ann. Military Education : A Reference Handbook. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007, pp. 82.

[5] Powell, D. A. The military applications of cloud computing technologies. 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589625 (accessed February 8, 2016).

[6]Watson, Cynthia Ann. Military Education : A Reference Handbook. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007, pp. 83.

[7] Marsico, Katie. ISIS. New York: ABDO, 2016, pp. 87.

Solution 2

Operation Inherent Resolve

The Building Partner Capacity line effort has increasingly been acknowledged as an important part of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). However, this line effort is faced by various challenges that ought to be reviewed and adequately addressed in order to facilitate the success of the initiative and to reduce the cost of the effort. This forms the importance of this paper as it addresses the various challenges that are faced in building partner capacity and provides various recommendations that could be embraced to eliminate such challenges. To understand the challenges that are faced in this line effort, this paper reviews literature including a report by the Inspector General on the various challenges that are faced by the DOD in efforts to facilitate capacity building. According to the findings of this paper, it is clear that improper documentation of procedural approaches both within the U.S. Army and the Iraqi Army has led to poor coordination of the processes and reduced accountability among personnel. On the other hand, poor support from the Government of Iraq and reduced cooperation of the Iraq Army leadership has also led to reduced staff morale and a reduced impact of the effort. These findings suggest that there is need for the appropriate administrators to coordinate their efforts towards isolating roles and responsibilities of all the parties with the view of promoting outcomes of the efforts and reducing cost.

Introduction

The United States Department of Defense is faced with an increasing challenge even as it intensifies its Operations Inherent Resolve (OIR) campaign to assist the Iraq army fight and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The combat operations have been hampered on various fronts even as the combined forces try to prevent ISIL from taking over new regions. With the cost of taking US troops to Iraq for combat being unrealistic as compared to the national interest in place, it has become more effective to train and equip the Iraq forces and other local forces through the Building Partner Capacity initiatives. Nevertheless, this has posed various challenges on for the Department of Defense (DOD), owing to the kind of logistical support required by the Iraq forces and their current state of impact.

Challenges of Building Partner Capacity Efforts

It is important to note that at the end of the building partner capacity initiative, which involves training and equipping the Iraq Army, the forces will have attained the required capacity to counterattack and successfully carry out combat operations against ISIL, thus securing their land and communities from the enemy[i]. Nevertheless, the major challenge that the DOD faces in this campaign involves internal deficiencies within the Iraq Army and the lack of proper leadership and government support. Success has been noted so far in terms of training the Iraq Army personnel and preparing them for future deployments. Nevertheless, lack of proper support from the Iraqi administration has hampered support efforts from the U.S. Army and proved costly. Case in point, most U.S. A&A personnel do not have proper knowledge concerning the inventory in the Iraqi controlled warehouses throughout Iraq. Moreover, some of the Iraqi Army personnel are equally in the dark concerning the available supplies[ii]. This has resulted from the Iraq Army leadership limiting the access of such warehouses by the U.S. advisors and failure of the former to update the inventory of the stored equipment and supplies. Such unclear knowledge concerning the available equipment and supplies means that the U.S. could be incurring additional costs procuring equipment and supplies that are available in the Iraqi controlled depots.

As much as the sovereignty held by Iraq is recognized, their inability to establish their supplies and equipment inventory, or to provide access of the warehouses to the U.S. advisors is a major challenge and is likely to impede the equipping and training carried out by the U.S. and Coalition at the BPC sites. In addition, this is likely to impede the ability of the Iraqi Army to sustain their combat operations. In addition, no assurance has been provided that supplies and equipment procured via the U.S. FMS program, received through donor nations, or secured through ITEF program requests have not been duplicated while referring to the supplies and equipment on-hand. To address this challenge, this paper suggests that the Operation Inherent Resolve Joint Task Force Commander should coordinate with the Minister of Defense, Iraq, to come up with a plan that would allow access of the warehouses by U.S. and Coalition personnel within a given time period.

As much as there is a follow-on plan for the Coalition and U.S. A&A and BPC effort in Iraq after training of the counterattack brigades has been concluded, most of the personnel are not aware of the follow-on mission[iii]. Such lack of communication concerning the follow-on mission is a major challenge for the OIR operations as it has contributed to uncertainties within the U.S. commands carrying out the BPC missions with regards to their future roles. Such could have a major impact on any future plans concerning BPC and A&A efforts. To solve such uncertainties, this paper recommends publication and update of the plan of the campaign to be completed by the Commanders of the Joint-Task Force. In addition, proper communication or dissemination of the plan should be effected all through the command and within classification constraints, with Iraq’s Ministry of Defense and Government.

Another challenge experienced in building partner capacity involves equipping of the Iraqi Army. In some cases, the U.S. procured and provided equipment to the Iraqi Army brigades throughout the BPC sites at times arrived incomplete, making the army inadequately capable of missions[iv]. Such hitches have been as a result of poor experience during the requirements generation and planning stage of the Pseudo-Foreign Military Sales (FMS) equipment procurement process, aimed at equipping the Iraqi Army personnel in BPC sites. On the other hand, the problem has been caused by poor definition of the quality assurance process as provided for by the Security Assistance Management Manual’s Chapter 15[v]. As much as there exists an informal process for quality assurance that reviews and coordinates ITEF pseudo-FMS issues within the procurement and supply chain, no proper written guidance have been put in place to formalize the procedure. A standard operating procedure document is required to provide a clear definition of the responsibilities and roles of the involved security personnel and any activities of quality assurance in the entire process. To address this challenge, this paper suggests that the Director of the Defense Security Operations Agency should coordinate with the implementing agencies and geographic combatant commands to establish a formal process for quality assurance review through a written standard operation procedure. This will allow for the identification of any errors at any phase of the pseudo-FMS equipment procurement process.

Furthermore, another challenge experienced by the DOD in their building Partner Capacity efforts involves lack of proper cooperation from the Government of Iraq[vi]. As much as the U.S. government and the coalition have established efforts towards training and equipping the Iraqi Army through BPC sites, the facilities that house the Iraqi Army trainees in most of the BPC sites remain inadequate. This is due to failure of the Government of Iraq to adequately invest the required resources or money to repair and upgrade the facilities. As a consequence, the poor living conditions of the trainees have significantly affected the morale of the soldiers, thus distracting them from their required focus on activities of training. Some of the soldiers go absent without leave, an aspect that could be attributed to the poor living conditions at the sites. The U.S. advisors and trainers, however, remain unaware of any efforts that have been put in place by the Government of Iraq to improve these conditions[vii]. In view of addressing this challenge, this paper recommends that the Operations Inherent resolve Joint Task Force Commander should coordinate with the Director of Iraq’s Office of Security Cooperation and the Commander of the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq and advise the Iraqi Minister of Defense concerning the use of funds by the Government of Iraq to improve and repair the billeting facilities for the Iraqi Army trainees at the BPC sites.

Conclusion

It is clear that the Building Partner Capacity line effort faces various challenges that ought to be adequately addressed if the full potential of the effort is to be realized and to allow for proper equipping of the Iraqi Army with the required capacity to handle the threat they are facing from the enemy. It is evident that the challenges are as a result of both poor management within the U.S. army and poor cooperation from the Iraqi Army and Government. As such, it is important for a consensus to be established between the U.S. and the Iraqi Administration with regards to the benefits that could be reaped from the initiative and the roles that are to be played by each party in order to realize such benefits.

[i] U.S. Government. 2015. Guide to Operation Inherent Resolve 2015: Nformation and Commentary on America’s War Against the Islamic State, Isis, Isil, Daesh Terrorists in Iraq and Syria. Createspace Independent Publisher. p. 65.

[ii] Inspector General. 2015. “Assessment of DoD/USCENTCOM and Coalition Plans/Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Iraqi Army to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.” U.S. Department of Defense. September 30. Accessed January 12, 2016. http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-177.pdf.

[iii] Inspector General 2015

[iv] Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations. 2014. “Operation Inherent Resolve.” Office of Inspector General. December 17. Accessed January 12, 2016. https://oig.state.gov/system/files/oir_042915.pdf. p. 28.

[v] Inspector General 2015

[vi] U.S. Government 53.

[vii] Inspector general 2015.